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ABSTRACT
This paper characterizes empirically how government budget variables,
such as spending, taxes, and deficits, affected private—sector consumption in
the high—budget—deficit economy of Israel during the first half of the
1980g. The paper develops and estimates an intertemporal optimizing model of
consumption choice by finite—lived individuals. The evidence supports this
formulation against the Ricardian infinite—horizon case, but it does not
support it when compared to the unrestricted relations in the data.
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1. Introduction
The impact of government budget variables on private—sector
consumption is a key issue in assessing the implications of fiscal. and
monetary policy on the real side of the economy. In fact there are sharp
controversies on this topic, most of which center around the Ricardian—
Equivalence proposition !'.Themain purpose of this paper is to provide
empirical evidence on this key issue for the case of Israel in the first half
of the 1980s. This case is of particular interest because of the high
volatility of movements in the budget deficit, government spending, and
private consumption in an economy with unusually high government budget
deficit; the deficit amounting to 15% of output, on average, during this
period. These characteristics differ from those of the more stable
environments studied in previous empirical works, and thus enable a more
powerful test of the comovements of private—sector consumption and public—
sector spending and financing variables.
The standard approach in empirical studies of these comovements has
been based on directly specifying regression equations linking consumption to
disposable income, measures of wealth, government spending, taxes, etc. (See
e.g., Kochin (1974), Tanner (1979), Feldstein (1982), Seater (1982), Kormendi
(1983), Reid (1985)). While the results from applying this approach are
informative, a limitation, which makes the interpretation of the results
ambiguous, is that the connection between the estimated equations and the
underlying theoretical model is not made explicit. In contrast, the present
study adopts an intertemporal optimizing framework whose implications, derived
explicitly in the analysis, are the subject of empirical tests.
Since the seminal contribution of Hall (1978), numerous studies have
applied the intertemporal optimizing approach to examine consumptionFR—031/DPR/09—02—86 2
behavior. However, almost none of these studies focus on the comovements of
consumption and government—budget variables. VMoreover,these studies
typically assume an infinite—horizon consumer. This assumption severely
restricts the economic channels through which government—budget finance exerts
its effects on consumption, resulting in an extreme case where the model
exhibits Ricardian properties. To move away from this extreme case, Blanchard
(1985) extended the intertemporal framework by relaxing the infinite—horizon
assumption. His formulation allows for a richer set of interactions between
government—budget—deficit variables and consumption, with Ricardian
implications emerging only as a special case.
In this investigation, we develop a version of Blanchard's model and
implement it to monthly time series data for Israel covering the 1980—1985
period. Section 2 outlines the model and derives the equations to be
estimated. Empirical results are reported in Section 3, and Section 4
contains concluding remarks.
2. The Model
We assume that there are overlapping generations of rational agents
that, due to mortality, have finite horizons. Specifically, there is a
probability y, smaller than unity, that individuals will survive to the next
period. A small open economy is considered, one that takes as given the world
interest rate.
Aggregating the budget constraints of all age groups yields the
following economy—wide budget constraint:
CB—RB1' +Y —T , (1) tt t—1 ttFR—031/DPR/09—02—86 3
where C denotes consumption; B is new private—sector debt at t; RB_1
represents the repayment of old debt at t (with R denoting one plus the
riskiess world real interest rate) Y denotes real income and T the value
of taxes. All variables are expressed in units of the all—purpose consumption
good.
Under the assumptions that individuals maximize expected lifetime
utility and that utility exhibits a constant intertemporal elasticity of
substitution, a, the aggregative consumption function can be written (in per—
capita terms) as:
=(l—s)W , (2)
where W is wealth and s is the savings/wealth ratio, expressed as
=alaand where 6 is the subjective discount factor. Wealth is equal
to the difference between the present value of future disposable income,





Note that the discount factor used in computing the present value of future
incomes is the effective (risk adjusted) factor, yIR.FR—031/DPR/09—02—86 4
Substituting (2) into the budget constraint (1) yields
B = + (l_s)(H—RB_i)— + T1,




Using a similar expression for B1 and the definition of W we can now
express consumption as follows:
C =(l—s)(l—Y)H
+aRC1
Notice that includes current and future taxes that are imposed on
the private sector. From the intertemporal government budget constraint, the





where C is the real value of government spending, D is the real value of the
change in the monetary base induced by the budget deficit, andBC is









Eq. (9) summarizes the implications of the model for the comovements
of consumption and government—budget variables and thus constitutes the focal
relation for our empirical work. Note that the present formulation is general
enough to encompass both Ricardian and non—Ricardian systems as special
cases. The key parameter, in this context, is y. When y =1the system
possesses Ricardian neutrality, and eq. (9) indicates that only C_1 can be
used to predict C (as in Hall (1978)). However, when y <1,the variable
affects current consumption over and beyond the impact of C_1. For example,
a current—period cut in taxes will result in an increase in perceived wealth
(through an increase in He). The reason is that the future tax increases that
are needed in order to balance the intertemporal budget constraint of
government are given a smaller weight, by the finite—horizon consumers, than
the weight they attach to the current cut in taxes.
3. Empirical Results
To implement eq. (9) it is necessary to specify a tractable empirical
counterpart for the infinite forward—looking sums in this equation. The
specification that we adopt assumes that all individuals alive at time t
expect future values of the components of H to remain at their current (time
t) levels. It is further assumed that the econometrician observes
individuals' Ht up to an error term'whichis orthogonal to presently





Several versions of this equation are estimated on the basis of
Israeli monthly data for the period 1980—1985. The use of monthly data
clearly limits our choices of the actual time series that serve as
counterparts for the variables in the model. For consumption we use two
indices: one of total purchases within the organized retail trade, C, and
another one, C, which excludes purchases of consumer durables from the
total. Total wage bill is used for Y; for C we use public—sector outlays
(excluding debt service); for T we use government tax receipts; and for D we
use the amount of money financing of the government—budget deficit. Since no
data are available on the stock of government debt, on a monthly basis, we







Substituting Eq. (11) into (10) yields the following equation







where B1G is the summation term on the right hand side of (11), and
Rtl. The data source is Bank of Israel's publication Recent Economic
Developments (various issues).
Tables 1 and 2 give the estimated equations J.Row1 in the tables
reports estimates of the unrestricted version of (12). With the exception of
all the coefficients on the government budget variables are statisticallyFR—031/DpR/09—02—86 7
significant, but only those of and T obtain the hypothesized signs. Row 2
imposes the Ricardian—neutrality restriction y =1.Comparing the fits of
these equations with the fits of the unrestricted equation yields the
statistics F(6, 62) =12.71and 9.50 for Tables 1 and 2 respectively. This
indicates rejection of the neutrality hypothesis at standard significance
levels. Row 3 reports estimates of (12) under the restrictions that are
implied by the model. To get parameter estimates we set the interest factor
at R =1.002and thus obtain the values of y and s reported in the tables.
(These estimates are quite insensitive to the choice of alternative,
plausible, values of R). For both tables, the annualized value of the
probability of survival turns out to be 0.988. The estimates for s are more
difficult to interpret because this parameter depends on two unknown
parameters, the subjective discount factor 6 and the intertemporal elasticity
a—i of substitution a, as follows: s =(y/6)(6R) .Forexample, if a =0then
s =(y/R)and from this perspective our estimated values for a appear to be
too low. However, if 6R < 1, which is the case of a net borrower, large
values of a yield low values of s, and from this perspective our estimates are
too high. Comparing the fits of Rows 2 and 3 yields the statistics
F(1, 67) =21.67and 17.22, which are statistically significant at the SZ
level. These results support relaxing the y =1restriction in the manner
specified by the model. However, comparing the fits of rows 1 and 3 yields
the statistics F (5, 62) =8.49and 6.53 for tables 1 and 2 respectively,
indicating rejection of the restricted version against the unrestricted one at
standard significance levels. This amounts to rejection of the joint
hypothesis consisting of eq. (9) and the auxiliary assumptions made in order
to implement it (as in eq. (12)). Relaxing and refining these assumptions
seems to us a promising task for further work, one that may result in a moreFR—031/DPR/09—02—86 8
general version of the intertemporal model which will conform more closely to
the data.
4. Concluding Remarks
This paper has shown that government budget variables, such as
spending, taxes, and deficits, have strong effects on private consumption in
the high—budget—deficit economy of Israel during the first half of the
1980s. These effects are shown to be at variance with the Ricardian
implications of an intertemporal optimization model with infinite—horizon
consumers. We developed a finite—horizon version of the intertemporal model,
which results in a richer set of potential channels through which government
budget variables affect consumption than in the infinite—horizon
formulation. The evidence supports the finite—horizon version over the
infinite—horizon one. However, the present finite—horizon version does not
conform sufficiently well with the unrestricted relations in the data,
suggesting the need for further refinements of the model and its auxiliary
assumptions, as well as the need for incorporating additional channels through
which government affects private consumption.FR—031/DpR/09—02—86 9
Table 1:
Consumption and Government—Budget Variables
(Israel, Monthly Data, 1980:4—1985:12)
1. Unrestricted
C =0.027Y—0.445C+0.121D +0.790T









3. Under the Restrictions in Eq. (12), with R =1.002
I =0.999 s =0.551
(0.0001) (0.098)
=0.653 SER =4.330
Note: Figures in parentheses are estimated standard errors. is the
adjusted coefficient of determination and SER is the standard error
of the regression. Rows 1 and 2 were estimated by ordinary least
squares, and row 3 by nonlinear least squares.FR—031/DPR/09—02—86 10
Table 2:
Consumption, Excluding Durables, and Government—Budget Variables
(Israel, Monthly Data, 1980:4 —1985:12)
1. Unrestricted
C" =0.015Y—0.257C+0.059D+0.405T





12 =0.796 SER =3.027
2. Under the y =1restriction
C =1.003
(0.009)t1
12 =0.642 SER =4.012
3. Under the Restrictions in Eq. (12), with R =1.002
-y =0.999 s =0.632
(0.0001) (0.091)
12 =0.708 SER =3.629
Note: See note to Table 1.FR—031/DPR/09—02-86 11
FOOTNOTES
1/ See Barro (1974).
2/ For an exception, see Aschauer (1985).
3/ For analysis of effects of fiscal policy in open economies using this
type of model, see Frenkel and Razin (1986).
4/ Throughout we use the assumption of a constant real rate. While this is
a restrictive assumption, it need not be very unrealistic in an economy
with widespread indexation in financial markets.
5/ rn this formulation the discount factor is (1/R), while it is (y/R) for
private (finite—lived) agents. For a related analysis and test of
equality of these discount factors, see van Wijnbergen (1985).
6/ The term R_1B1 was treated as a constant in the estimations.FR—031/DPR/09—02--86 12
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